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The 2011 Occupy Wall Street protest movement, that for several months five 
years ago captured the political imagination and discontents of a healthy slice of the 
millennial generation, adopted what on first blush appears to be a peculiar literary 
mascot: Bartleby the scrivener, one of the two protagonists of the Story of Wall 
Street penned by Herman Melville in the middle of the nineteenth century.1   
Melville’s dysfunctional scrivener was prominently displayed on the OWS 
protesters’ posters, his story was given several readings during evenings in the 
parks, and his very being – meaning both his passive resistance to his employer’s 
various requests and his sheer and undeniably animalistic physicality – was widely 
hailed by the organizers and occupiers of the 2011 movement as the “original wall 
street occupier.”2 Melville’s Bartleby, after all, was an uncooperative employee who 
first engaged in a work stoppage and then literally occupied the offices of the Wall 
Street lawyer who had hired him, then fired him, and who had then attempted – 
unsuccessfully – to evict him. The OWS protesters found common cause. 
The appropriation by this twenty first century left-wing protest movement of 
a protagonist from a canonical mid-nineteenth century novella didn’t just come out 
of the blue.  As I will discuss in some detail in the first section below, Melville’s Story 
of Wall Street has for several decades now been a staple of analysis by Marxist, neo-
Marxist, structuralist, post-structuralist, and socio-critical academic literary critics, 
all of whom, like the OWS’ers, connect Bartleby’s plight to class-based sympathies, 
labor politics, or protest. Nevertheless, and despite both the academic left-wing 
interest in Bartleby and the formal convergences of location and status, this 
empathic identity of interests between those twenty-first century street protesters 
pushing back against the dominance of the .01% – the Wall Street financiers, stocks 
and debt speculators, and the money marketers – on the one hand, and a pathetic, 
melancholic, cadaverous, anorexic, apparently suicidal, and fictional mid-nineteenth 
century legal scrivener on the other, is decidedly odd.  Recall, first, Bartleby’s 
narrative trajectory, which doesn’t, or shouldn’t, inspire confidence for the OWS’ers:  
a few weeks into his employment as a scrivener in the narrator’s Wall Street law 
office, Bartleby announces, in a response to his employer’s eminently reasonable 
request, that he “would prefer not” to proofread the mortgage documents he had 
just copied.3  A few days later he makes clear that he would likewise prefer not to do 
any proofreading of any documents,4 and shortly thereafter that he would prefer not 
to do any copying either.5  He eventually states that he would prefer not to run 
errands,6 and finally that he would unequivocally prefer not to do any work at all.7   
Then, for some unspecified period of time – certainly weeks, maybe months – 
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following this latest announcement he stands stationary in the office, doing nothing.  
His employer – the narrator – implores him to leave the premises, but Bartleby 
would prefer not to go, and as the narrator doesn’t have the fortitude to forcibly 
evict him, Bartleby remains in the office, sleeping at night and standing stationary 
and silent during the day.  Thus, his “occupation” of the Wall Street office.  Our 
narrating lawyer can’t figure out a way to either fire or evict Bartleby that would be 
consistent with the demands of conscience, so he eventually leaves the premises 
himself, renting an office elsewhere, leaving Bartleby standing alone in the deserted 
office space.8  A subsequent tenant with no such moral qualms has Bartleby taken by 
the constabulary to the Tombs, where he announces that he would prefer not to 
accept food and consequently dies from starvation.9   
So, it is true, as his OSW celebrants have all suggested, that Bartleby did 
indeed engage in both a work stoppage and an occupation of a “Wall Street office” – 
so perhaps it is fair to describe him as the “First Wall Street Occupier.”  
Nevertheless, Bartleby’s an odd hero for this left wing populist movement.  First, 
Bartleby is no Thoreauvian civilly-disobedient protester.   He never articulates a 
demand of either his employer or the state, he never explains his position, he never 
even nods toward a different vision of work, or life, or sustenance, or community, or 
humanity.  His “occupation” is successful – to the limited degree it succeeds – only 
because of the lawyer’s pricks of conscience, and it fails when the lawyer’s 
prudential concern for his own law practice supersedes fellow feeling.  More 
fundamentally, Bartleby does not mount any resistance at all to, or evidence any 
dissatisfaction with, his employer’s “snug business dealing with rich men’s bonds 
and mortgages and title deeds” – that particular description of the work of the office 
Bartleby’s occupying comes from the narrator himself, not Bartleby.  Nor does 
Bartleby complain of his status or treatment as an employee.  He is not striking for 
better wages or working conditions.   As a number of commentators have observed, 
Bartleby doesn’t even refuse to work in any unequivocal sense – he simply states, 
repeatedly, that he “would prefer not to” do the various tasks asked of him.  And 
most notably, and most unlike the protesters who have adopted him as an icon, 
Bartleby is utterly, profoundly, will-less, and twice over, in the manner in which he 
declares his own recalcitrance: first he states that recalcitrance in terms of his 
preferences, rather than with any declarations of will or intention – “I would prefer 
not to,” he says, rather than “I won’t,” or “hell no” or “take this job and shove it.”   
And second, he uses the conditional, or more precisely the conditional modal case, “I 
would prefer not to” rather than the direct case “I prefer not to” even when putting 
forward his preferences.    He’s stating a descriptive truth about his hypothetical 
preferences – a far cry from an unequivocal refusal to do anything.  So simply as a 
protester, Bartleby’s pretty lame.  
 Nor does Bartleby make for a particularly compelling proletarian victim of 
capitalist excesses.   First, he’s an employee in a comfortable office working for a 
kind-enough-hearted employer, not a factory worker toiling in inhumane conditions 
unto an early death.  Melville was by no means blind to the plight of such workers: 
simply contrast his horrific depiction of the ashen-faced Maids in a paper factory, in 
The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids,10 written just a year after 
Bartleby, who do indeed work themselves to an early death manufacturing the 
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paper on which the lawyer-bachelors of Fleet Street ply their luxury-drenched trade.   
Bartleby’s work conditions don’t compare in the slightest to that of the maids’ – and 
his employer’s circumstances likewise don’t come anywhere near the hedonistic 
excesses enjoyed by the lawyers in The Paradise of Bachelors.  Indeed, Bartleby the 
scrivener is closer in economic class and even in the nature of his work to the 
lawyer who is his employer – Bartleby is copying those mortgages and bond 
documents, rather than writing them, but nevertheless both are putting loan 
agreements backed by either real property or business assets onto paper – than he 
is to the proletariat working to facilitate those capital processes, and who is so 
graphically depicted in Tartarus.  But second, and more to the point, it simply isn’t 
the case that Bartleby the scrivener’s great burden in life is due to economic want.  
Bartleby is not forced to choose dreary or stultifying or inhumane employment over 
death; very much to the contrary.  At various points in the story Bartleby is given a 
menu of pleasant-enough options by his increasingly desperate employer: he is 
offered other forms of work both in the office – he might run errands rather than do 
any copying at all – as well as outside of it – such as working as a bartender, his 
employer suggests, or even working “in the open air” as a traveling companion.11   
He is offered the option of living free of charge in his employer’s home, and finally of 
simply accepting his charity.12  Once removed to prison, he is offered food, prepared 
for him by a prison cook specifically tasked with his oversight, and all to be paid for 
by his ex-employer, but Bartleby would prefer not to accept that offer as well.13  
Whatever it is, then, Bartleby’s problem is not that he is coerced into accepting 
subordinating, humiliating or horrendous work because his only choice is death.  He 
is not so coerced, for the simple enough reason that he is given plenty of choices and 
he seemingly prefers death – even over the choice of not working at all and living 
free of charge with his employer.  The problem of the novel, though, is that neither 
the reader nor narrator has any clue as to why.  Maybe he’s doing this as a protest of 
the ways in which other workers are forced into employment by the coercive fear of 
death, much as a football player might refuse to play a game or a student or a 
prisoner might embark on a hunger strike to draw attention to the plight of his 
aggrieved fellow students or prisoners, even if the striker feels under no such 
coercion himself.  But we don’t have any reason to think that social solidarity any 
more than necessity is what motivates Bartleby.  We don’t have any evidence that he 
has any social motivations at all. 
But the problem goes deeper.  Bartleby is, as several commentators put the 
point, really, deeply, truly, inescapably, odd.  He seems deranged, both to the reader 
and the lawyer-employer-narrator, who does indeed describe his other employees 
at various points as useful machines,14 but who describes Bartleby, even from the 
beginning, as ghostly, apparitional, pallid, forlorn, corpse-like, cadaverous, or sickly, 
on almost every page.15   And, Bartleby is unquestionably sick.  His eyesight is failing 
him and he eats almost nothing.16 He stares at blank walls all day, day in and day 
out.  He has biological needs, which he meets only minimally and inadequately, and 
needless to say never exercises, although his physical presence looms large in the 
story.  Bartleby lacks vitality, or animus, as well as will.  He has so little interiority 
that, as with anorexics, his exterior self is sickly translucent.  Perhaps he is a political 
dissident of some sort, or an alienated laborer, but what he unquestionably is, is 
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mentally ill: a victim of his own inner demons of which both the reader and the 
narrator know nothing.   It is of course possible to pity him – as the narrator does.17  
That pity itself becomes problematic: the narrator has a coldly transactional 
understanding of pity’s economic value to the pitier, as well as of the value of the 
charity to which it can lead.18  The reader should perhaps look skeptically at the pity 
Bartleby sparks, both in the narrator and in himself.  But however we come to 
assess our own or the narrator’s pity for Bartleby, it is much harder to understand 
how we might empathize with such a creature: how, that is, we might recognize 
ourselves in Bartleby’s recalcitrance.  But this is precisely what the OWSers did – or 
claimed to do.  Bartleby the story was not just of interest to the OWSers.  Rather, 
they seemingly recognized themselves in Bartleby the man; they claimed his 
aspirations and his humanity as their own, or they claimed their own aspirations 
and humanity as his.  He was like them.  They were like him.  Bartleby was their fully 
human compatriot.  Why?  What did the OWSers recognize, like, or empathize with, 
in this notably odd character, whose protest, if that is what it was, so spectacularly 
failed, and who steadfastly refused to reveal anything about his motivations?  Why 
did the protesters find Bartleby sympatico, and so sympatico, in fact, as to put his 
name on their posters, to claim him as their own, and to read the story Melville 
wrote about his fate, in the park?  
In the bulk of this paper, I will ask and try to answer this question: what did 
the OWS protesters recognize in a non-pathologized Bartleby that sparked their 
empathic identification?  More broadly, what is it, in Bartleby and in his 
recalcitrance that is recognizably and deeply human?   Eventually, I will argue – 
drawing heavily on and then expanding upon an essay written several decades ago 
by Brook Thomas on the jurisprudential background of Melville’s story19 – that 
Bartleby the man –not Bartleby the symbol, or Bartleby the distilled essence of 
negative potentiality, or Bartleby the vessel – can be understood to suffer from an 
extreme case of what I will call “consensual dysphoria,” a phrase I’ve made up, but 
by which I mean a disorienting and disabling consciousness of a radical disjuncture 
between one’s felt subjective pleasures and pains, and the transactions and states of 
the world to which one gives one’s free or voluntary consent.   Consensual 
dysphoria, as I will describe it, is an affliction felt by individuals – and thus sensibly 
subject to narrative treatment – but it is not a psychological malady that afflicts 
subjects because of the machinations of intimate, familial, or private life. It is, rather, 
a political malady – an affliction – felt by individuals in liberal states, and brought on 
by the powers of political rhetoric and influence.  My claim will be that consensual 
dysphoria has been an acutely felt part of the consciousness of both the classical 
legal thought of the mid-nineteenth century and the liberal legalist thought of our 
own time period. Melville’s Bartleby had that condition in extremis, and the 21st 
century protesters suffer from it as well.  They recognized that fact, and identified 
with Bartleby because of it.  That commonality, I want to suggest, lays the 
groundwork for the otherwise pretty inexplicable empathic bond between them.   
The first part below discusses in very summary fashion some of the scholarly 
literature on Bartleby, with an eye toward elucidating why it is that so few scholars 
have felt the need to understand Bartleby’s political malady – or more generally, to 
understand his humanity.  The second part briefly discusses the jurisprudential 
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background and content of the story, expanding where need be on Thomas’s 
similarly motivated account from the 1980s.  The third and fourth parts introduce 
the idea of “consensual dysphoria” as an individualized, psychic manifestation of 
some of the discomforts attendant to liberal and neoliberal markets and state 
organization, and makes the case that this is the essence of Bartleby’s affliction.  I 
conclude with some observations about the OWS movement informed by some 
aspects of this analysis.  
 
 
 
A. Ah, Bartleby!  Ah, Humanity?   
 
So, what afflicts Bartleby?  What are we to make of Bartleby the man, rather 
than Bartleby the Scrivener?  Recent scholarship – and particularly Marxist accounts 
from the last quarter of the last century, and then neo-marxist and post-structuralist 
accounts from the first two decades of this one, all of which I will sometimes call, 
collectively, the “protest scholarship” – on Bartleby largely sidesteps the question.   
For virtually all of the participants in the protest scholarship, Bartleby the man, or 
even just Bartleby the character, is marginalized.  There’s just no need to 
understand him, apparently, and for some at least, it’s really better that we don’t; it’s 
part of the point of the story, in fact, that we not. This alone is striking.  The last 
utterance of the narrator, and the last sentence of the story, recall, is:  “Ah Bartleby!  
Ah humanity!”20   Yet his professional readers, and particularly the protest 
literature, bleach Bartleby of humanity. 
Let me give just a few examples.  First, in a seminal piece from 1974, Louise 
Barnett read Melville’s Bartleby as an allegory dramatizing either the 
commodification of nature into property and then into securities and eventually into 
profit – the lawyer’s “snug business,” after all, was managing “rich men’s bonds and 
mortgages and title deeds” – or the alienation of labor, either in the office itself, or in 
the factories and railroads those offices serviced, or both.21 Barnett’s (and others’) 
Marxist interpretation of Bartleby was more than well taken, whatever Melville’s 
familiarity with Marx: the novella is unquestionably replete with images 
suggestively signifying the deadening effects of both commodification and 
alienation, on nature and laborers respectively, from the outside walls that face the 
lawyer’s office’s windows on all sides – the literal walls of Wall Street – and that 
Bartleby stares at for hours at a time and that encase the office in a coffin, to the arc 
of the lawyer’s work: reducing nature, through the processes of law, to “property,” 
and then reducing that property to collateral for loans, and then the loans 
themselves to profit, all of which is facilitated by, first, the lawyer’s expertise in 
recording those agreements on paper, and then the copying and re-copying labor of 
scriveners – who are referred to by their employer as machines – and whose jobs of 
course are eventually themselves overtaken by machines, although after the time 
period of the story itself.  All of this is more than ripe for Marxist interpretation.  
Nevertheless, it’s fair to say that Bartleby himself, on Barnett’s account, is not so 
much a character as he is a symbol: Bartleby is a representative of an alienated and 
largely off-stage workforce.22  His malady, his motives, his character, and his 
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emotions don’t enter the analysis.  They don’t matter.  Bartleby himself lacks 
humanity.  The story, in Barnett’s reading, is a story of and about Wall Street.  
Bartleby facilitates the unraveling of an argument.  He’s not truly a character, even, 
much less a recognizably human one. 
The second strand of protest literature is jurisprudential, and plays a larger 
role in my own analysis; I will largely endorse and expand on it below.  Here, my 
point is narrower, and parallels the above: the jurisprudential and Horwitzian 
reading that Brook Thomas provided of Melville’s Story of Wall Street in 1987,23 like 
Barnett’s Marxist reading from two decades earlier, criticized Marxist readings 
along the lines suggested above, but then it similarly sidelined Bartleby himself.  
Thomas read Bartleby the Scrivener as dramatizing not simply an alienated, 
commodified, or injured workforce (as had Barnett), but more precisely, the 
legitimating mid-nineteenth century legal mindset – what is today called (following 
Morton Horwitz’s lead) “classical legal thought” – that became dominant during that 
time period, and that facilitated all of that commodification and alienation, in part, 
by dulling both the class consciousness of the subordinated, and the conscience of 
elites, both legal and otherwise.24  Classical legal thought of mid-nineteenth century 
America, Thomas argued, following Horwitz, conveyed a rhetoric that instilled, 
among much else, a comfort among legal actors with a legal world stripped of 
equitable and republican constraints on the rise of the powers of contract, and 
hence of any constraints which compassion might have otherwise placed on the 
various operations of capital. Again, Thomas’s reading of Bartleby as a critical 
commentary on Classical Legal Thought is largely convincing, I think, and I will 
endorse it (with substantial expansion and modification) below.  The story is 
indeed, as Thomas argues, mostly about and told through the eyes of the narrating 
lawyer, who in turn experiences – both in the changing nature of his work and in the 
changing contours of his conscience – the monumental shift rippling through the 
very fields of law in those mid-century decades in which he practiced: a shift away 
from equity to legalism, from status-defined and defining relations to contract, and 
most broadly, from a republican and paternalistic conception of the community, to a 
highly individualistic one, shorn of confining roles but also shorn of obligations of 
care of the strong for the weak.25   Here, I just want to note that Bartleby himself, on 
Thomas’s reading, is basically an afterthought.  The story is just not about him.  
Rather, “classical legal thought,” or “formalism,” on this view, is the story’s real 
target and, Melville, Thomas argues, whether or not he had a name for it, basically 
nailed it. The story is about the ways in which Classical Legal Thought molded, 
formed, and deformed a mid-nineteenth century lawyer’s conscience.  So, on 
Thomas’s view, no less than on Bartlett’s, Bartleby himself hardly enters into the 
analysis; the story is not about Bartleby, or even the narrator’s relation to Bartleby, 
rather, it is about the lawyer’s relationship to law, or, perhaps, to legal ideology.  
Consistent with Thomas’s reading, the narrator’s last utterance – Ah Bartleby!  Ah 
humanity! – is a cry for the loss of the lawyer’s humanity, effectuated 
jurisprudentially.  It is not so much about the loss of his scrivener’s.  
Third: through the aughts and teens of this century, Melville’s Bartleby has 
been taken up in a major way by prominent critical social philosophers as being in 
some sense emblematic of the limits, potentialities, and necessity of class-based 
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political protest in the context of a totalizing liberal statism.  Thus, Bartleby’s 
recalcitrance on the job – and particularly the “formulaic” way in which he 
expresses his conditional preference not to do it – is treated as a symbol of the 
negative potentiality of absolute resistance to an omnipresent sovereignty in 
Agamben’s Homo Sacer – Bartleby’s conditional preference not to work, Agamben 
argues, “offers the strongest objection to the principle of sovereignty.”26   More 
expansively, Agamben treats Bartleby as a symbol of potentiality itself in the 
culminating essay in his book Potentialities, which is entirely devoted to a reading of 
Melville’s Bartleby.27   Bartleby is similarly invoked as emblematic of an absolute 
negative opposition to the state in Hardt and Negri’s The Empire,28 and as a symbol 
of the politics of “protestation,” rather than of “resistance,” for Zizek, opening a 
“politics which opens up a new space outside the hegemonic position and its 
negation.”29  Pushing back against all of these poststructuralist readers, Professor 
Jonathan Poore has argued recently that Melville’s Bartleby in no way constitutes 
either a Thoreauvian or an Agambenian protest against the state, and that it is a 
mistake to read it as such.30  Rather, Poore argues, Bartleby should be read as a 
protest against not states at all but markets and the liberal economies that 
accommodate them: Bartleby’s refusals are not refusals to participate as a subject in 
a sovereign state, but rather, they are refusals to participate in the market-based 
machinations of the capitalization of body and soul.  Bartleby’s complacent 
willingness to be imprisoned, furthermore, far from representing a protest against 
the state, for Poore, nods instead in the direction of the need for an activist state 
against market-based, private sphere, ideological hegemony, and the private 
oppressions to which those markets lead. 
   But for Poore, no less than for Agamben, Zizek, Hardt, and Negri, and as was 
true in different ways for Thomas and Barnett, Bartleby is not a character in any 
ordinary sense – meaning one we can make sense of, so to speak, empathically.  For 
all of the twenty first century protest readers, no less than for Bartlett and Thomas 
in the twentieth, Bartleby is a symbol, not a man: he is a symbol, basically, of protest 
against oppression, whether the protest be against markets, capitalism, 
employment, classical legal thought, liberal individualism, or the state.   The protest 
readers do embrace – and for radically different and also contradictory reasons, it 
should be noted – Bartleby’s conditional preference “not to” – viewing it, alternately, 
as the “strongest possible protest against sovereignty,”  (Agamben, from Homo 
Sacre) or as emblematic of potentiality itself and therefore as an echo of obliterated 
pasts (Agamben, Potentialities), as  symbolizing a politics of “protestation” rather 
than “obstruction,” (Hardt and Negri) or as the embodiment of a negativity so 
absolute and so absent of content that its value as protest lies solely in its capacity to 
clear the path for humanistic societal reconstruction” (Zizek).  But embracing 
Bartleby’s near-disembodied conditional preference “not to” – his “formula of 
refusal,” as it has come to be called – as a symbol of an idealized even if doomed 
form of protest against sovereignty – and whether of potentiality, of protestation, or 
of negativity – is a far cry from embracing Bartleby the man, or for that matter, from 
reckoning him.    
Again note the continuity with earlier readings.  For all of the protest readers, 
from Bartlett to Poore, the very lack of development of Bartleby’s character – the 
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absence of his humanity, in fact – facilitates the reading.  There are other similarities 
across all of these readings in the protest literature, from the sixties to the present: 
they all focus, albeit for different reasons, on Melville’s metaphorical illusions in this 
Story of Wall Street to the office as a place that embodies or presages death and 
coffins, to the narrator’s multiple illusions to laborers as machines, and of course to 
the multiple reminders that the lawyer’s work involves reducing land and labor to 
profit.31  And, all of these professional readers have been drawn to Bartleby’s 
recalcitrance, and all see in that recalcitrance much that illuminates the 
predicament of actors in contemporary liberal and capitalist states.  But what the 
academic protest readers don’t do is confront or discuss Bartleby as a fully formed, 
flesh and blood, sickly man who makes some decisions, acts on them, and dies 
because of them, for reasons we might discern.   Rather, Bartleby exists for virtually 
all of these commentators as an abstraction: Bartleby is a vessel of pure 
potentiality,32 or he is a representative of some off-stage oppressed class,33 or he is 
simply a plot device who serves to illuminate the evolution of the lawyer’s own 
conscience and consciousness.34   This is, itself, peculiar and noteworthy.  Again, 
remember that this Story of Wall Street closes with the narrating lawyer’s lament: 
“Ah Bartleby!  Ah humanity!”  What Bartleby never is, though, in the eyes of his 
scores of politically sympathetic academic readers, is a member of humanity, 
sharing much of anything with those who interpret him. 
In contrast to the massive protest literature on Bartleby, there is a much 
smaller second group of professional readers – call them the psychological readers – 
and perhaps many casual readers as well – who do embrace Bartleby’s humanity, or 
at least, they embrace, and countenance, his sickness.  For these readers, if the story 
has any political meaning, it’s a plea for greater funding for services for the 
profoundly mentally ill.  Bartleby the Scrivener, in their hands, is not a story about 
capitalism or employment or commodification of labor or the alienation of the 
writing class or for that matter Wall Street, at all.  Rather, it’s a story about an 
anorexic, melancholic, oppositional and thoroughly unsympathetic employee. The 
psychological readers are in the distinct minority, but they do focus directly on 
Bartleby the man, and specifically on Bartleby’s oddities, for which they then 
provide a range of diagnoses – Bartleby is, depending on the reader, depressive, 
melancholic, possibly schizophrenic, borderline or bipolar.35 For the Freudians, he is 
a projection of the lawyer’s id,36 while for others, more biographically inclined, he is 
(and quite plausibly) a projection of Melville’s own deeply ambivalent relation to his 
own career as a writer.37  The psychological readers, unlike the political, do clearly 
recognize Bartleby’s humanity, albeit primarily to pathologize and then diagnose 
him.  The psychological readers, though, also have a problem, at least as acute as the 
protest readers: just as the protest readers can’t account for (and don’t try to 
account for) Bartleby as a man (and hence, aren’t much interested in the 
psychological or psychic dimensions of Bartleby’s malady), so the psychological 
readers can’t account for (and don’t much try to account for) the story’s equally 
undeniable politics.  Bartleby isn’t just any old schizophrenic or melancholic or 
manic-depressive who wanders in off the street into just any old office.  This story is 
after all set on Wall Street, and more particularly in a Law Office on Wall Street; 
there are multiple references to the substantive law that constitutes the lawyer’s 
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work, just as there is an undeniable focus on the nature of the employment relation 
between the lawyer and his scriveners.  None of this – the location on Wall Street, 
the nature of the lawyer’s work, the focus on the employment relationship itself – 
contributes in the slightest to an understanding of bipolarity or depression or 
schizophrenia or the lawyer’s or Melville’s id.  Most important, though, and as Brook 
Thomas argued some time ago, it is the lawyer’s consciousness, and particularly the 
lawyer’s ruminations regarding the various relations between work, charity, 
contract, and what might be called the ethics of economic life, that dominates the 
story.  Whatever then may be true of Bartleby the character, and whatever the 
nature of his sickness, Bartleby the Scrivener is indeed in some sense a “Story of Wall 
Street,” as its title proclaims, and as the political protest readers all in various ways 
recognize or assume.   
Against this backdrop, the OWS’ers embrace of Bartleby as “the original wall 
street occupier” is strikingly distinctive: it stands in some contrast to all of these 
professional readers.  Unlike the professional psychological readers, the OWSers 
seemingly embraced an un-pathologized Bartleby the man: not Bartleby the 
psychiatric case or Bartleby the schizophrenic, or Bartleby the projection, or 
Bartleby the dream.  But, unlike the protest readers, they also embraced a 
humanized Bartleby: not Bartleby the political symbol, or Bartleby the class 
representative, or Bartleby the proletariat, or Bartleby the enigma, or Bartleby the 
ghost, or Bartleby the Christ figure, or Bartleby the messiah, or Bartleby the vessel 
of negative potentiality, or Bartleby the plot device.  They saw Bartleby, in short, 
neither as fundamentally sick, nor as fundamentally symbolic.  They saw in Bartleby 
a compatriot: a flesh and blood fellow traveler who engaged in a work stoppage, 
occupied an office, and ended his life in a hunger strike.  The OWSer’s, in other 
words, didn’t just reckon Bartleby’s significance.   They recognized him.    They 
empathized with him.  In fact, they identified with him. They shared in his humanity, 
and he in theirs.  So, again, why?  Where’s the commonality? 
 
B.  Bartleby and Classical Legal Thought 
 
 The key, I believe, lies in the jurisprudence.  As Brook Thomas rightly noted 
in his essay from a couple decades back, Melville’s Story of Wall Street is indeed set – 
and was written – at the apex of the jurisprudential era legal historians now refer to 
as “Classical Legal Thought.”38  The basic contours of the jurisprudential shift 
thereby inaugurated – what Morton Horwitz called “formalism” in his seminal 
historical treatment of the era The Transformation of American Law39 – is described, 
largely implicitly but also at times explicitly, in Melville’s story, and with almost 
eerie pitch perfection, as Thomas’s essay shows.  Virtually all of the major legal 
developments Horwitz chronicled in his important history of the era are central to 
either the law itself, practiced in Bartleby’s employer’s office, to his employer’s 
consciousness, which is on constant display throughout the narrative, or to the 
background conditions within which the narrator tries to cope with his enigmatic 
scrivener: the rise of contract, the demise of both status-based legal relations and 
republicanism, the diminution of tort as a regulator of employment relations, the 
reduction of any paternalistic role of the state for the wellbeing of the economically 
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weak, and the convergence of interest of the entrepreneurial class, capitalists, 
industrialists, and the judiciary.  All of these were part of the changing contours of 
American private law in the middle of the nineteenth century, and Melville’s Story of 
Wall Street is set against them.  Thomas well captured most of that era’s 
transformation’s manifestations in Melville’s account of the life of lawyers and their 
scrivening staffs, in his essay.  But he missed a few.  And, because he missed a few, 
he missed one big one:  the consensual dysphoria that may be the era’s most 
disabling legacy.  I’ll take up these points in that order. 
So first, the transformation in American law, as described by Horwitz, 
dramatized by Melville, and as accurately but only partially summarized by Thomas.   
The first such manifestation of that transformation that hits you, although Thomas 
doesn’t dwell on it, is the narrator’s self-interested disgust, introduced in the first 
pages of the story, with the disappearance of the Equity Courts in New York, 
effectuated by the adoption of the Field Code.40  That “merger,” as it came to be 
called, of “law” and “equity” eventually caused the narrator to lose his position – and 
additional income – that had been accorded him as a “Chancery Judge” – a 
distinctive quasi judicial position, which at the time was by custom given to a 
member of the Bar and hence a practicing lawyer, and who would hear cases that 
arose in “equity” rather than law.  As all first year law students are taught, the 
“merger of law and equity” which Melville’s lawyer lamented, brought about by that 
constitutional change in New York law and eventually in all states’ procedural law, 
ushered in the end of equity itself – an alternative system of principles, in some form 
available from antiquity, to the sometimes unjustly harsh rigors of rules of the 
common law, including the unjustly harsh rigors of contract law.41  A part of that 
alternative equity regime included principles that softened the possible harshness 
of contract law itself – what later came to be called the “unconscionablility” doctrine, 
and which in a tortured history has nearly disappeared – and in part as a 
consequence of the merger of law and equity that Bartleby’s employer lamented.42     
Second, and as Thomas argues in detail, was the shifting legal doctrine of charity, 
brought on in no small part through the opinions of Melville’s father in law, Chief 
Justice Lemuel Shaw, and which had the effect of privatizing all aid to the poor and 
thus underscoring the law’s relative disinterest in providing the same.43  Although 
the changing law is nowhere mentioned in Bartleby, nevertheless, the narrator 
reflects on his own charitable impulses,44 the existence of private charity as the only 
possible source of sustenance for his dysfunctional scrivener, and the tasty “morsel 
of conscience” that can be gained by indulging one’s beneficient inclinations,45 both 
as a guard against the danger to self and others of indulging one’s own criminal 
instincts,46 and as a way to balance the books of civic duty and commercial gain.47  
The felt and perpetual conflict between the narrator’s inclination to act charitably 
toward Bartleby – to embrace him as a fellow son of Adam, as he puts it at one 
pivotal point48 – and his professional inclination to employ him, use his services, fire 
him when those services are wanting, and then to evict him when he proves to be an 
embarrassment, basically frame the narrative’s arc.  All of this Thomas successfully 
stands in comparison to the contemporaneous Shavian decisions regarding the 
emergence of a near-totalizing privatization of the republican duties of the state to 
care for those who can’t do so for themselves, through an expanded role of estate 
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law, and more specifically, through not just a greater deference to the will of 
testators but also to the demands of family members.49  Family and individual 
beneficence, the law declared, not state or community patriarchs, would care for 
their own, henceforth.  Third, Thomas sets Melville’s story against the radical 
diminution of not just the role of status in setting responsibilities in legal relations, 
but also the diminishing role of tort law, as the century progressed, as a vehicle for 
holding corporate employers responsible for the injuries suffered by their 
employees.  The latter transformation in particular marked the beginnings of an era 
of laissez faire in employment relations, and an end of a more republican as well as 
more status-based and communitarian account of the role of the state in structuring 
– and protecting – employees.50  
Now on the transformation Thomas didn’t note, but which is fully supportive 
of his thesis.  Of at least equal importance, although Thomas doesn’t mention it, to 
both the classical legal thought of the era and to Bartleby, as the diminution of tort 
and the rise of private charity, is the expansion, clarification, and crystallization, as 
one commentator has put it, of the content of contract law itself – and of contract 
theory likewise.  Basically, the narrator’s relationship to Bartleby is completely 
exhausted by, first, the terms of his contract with him – an employment contract 
hastily entered, and then painfully ended – and then, eventually, by Bartleby’s 
contractual “tenancy” in his office, also hastily entered and then painfully 
terminated.  Bartleby’s employment, of course, was “at will” – Bartleby had no right 
to his job, and no right to any particular terms, and likewise the employer had no 
obligation to employ Bartleby, to keep Bartleby employed, or to oversee his welfare.  
Their contractual relationship – both the existence and the continuation of that 
contract – depended entirely on their mutual consent.  On this point the law was 
clear and in the process of becoming all the clearer: the common law of contract law 
was in the process, case by case, of shedding the burdens of rules of equity, which 
may have conditioned the terms of the contract with concerns of fairness,51 and of 
freeing contractors of any equitable obligation to contract with anyone other than 
partners who were freely chosen – thus the narrator was no obligation to contract 
with Bartleby or to keep Bartleby, or any of his other scriveners, in his employ any 
longer than would be useful to him.  The narrator could terminate the relationship 
with any of his scriveners at any point, a power to which the narrator makes 
multiple references in the course of his story.52  The scriveners had no rights – 
either to the job, to its continuation, or to terms – that might have followed on the 
heels of their tenure in the office, the quality of their performance, or certainly on 
the basis of their need.  The law that had in earlier times been one of “status” – the 
branch of the law determining the relation of master and servant – became 
“employment law,” and employment law became “contract law”: thus masters and 
servants became employers and employees, who in turn became freely contracting 
parties, such that their relations became determined entirely by terms freely chosen 
between them, rather than by anything imposed by law. The same could be said of 
the law of tenancy: landlord and tenant became freely contracting parties, whose 
relationship and the duties it entailed were a function of their contract, not their 
status.  
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 Contract law, in other words, during this time period, became “crystalline” in 
its contours: obligations were starkly conditioned on mutual consent, rather than on 
consent as modified by, or muddied up by, either law or status. Contract theory was 
likewise moving in the same direction: the very basis of contractual obligation, 
according to the evolving and somewhat mutating “doctrine of consideration” of the 
time, was a promised exchange of values that would prove mutually beneficial, not 
any expectation or any reliance created in another by virtue of promises, and not the 
prospect of an injury that might be sustained by virtue of a promise broken.53  Thus, 
the narrator, according to the theory of contract then emerging, need maintain 
Bartleby’s employment – as well as that of his other scriveners – only to the degree 
it was and remained profitable to him to do so, a limit on his obligations of which he 
was well aware – not any reliance that might have been induced in his scriveners by 
virtue of their status.  Bartleby’s “tenancy” likewise was subject to the narrator’s 
will.  The narrator knew that he could charge Bartleby with trespass and have him 
physically removed, and in a bout of catastrophic thinking he worries that if he 
doesn’t do so – if he impliedly consents to Bartleby’s occupation of his office – 
Bartleby may well outlive him and inherit the office through adverse possession – 
the scenario that prompted the narrator in a panic to remove himself from the 
office, as he can’t bring himself to have Bartleby evicted.54  Both of these contractual 
relations – the employment relation and then the relation of tenancy -- dominate the 
narrator’s consciousness, and both compete in his ruminations with the dictates of 
conscience: the law of contract and property give the employer the right and the 
power to rid himself of his noxious scrivener, while the demands of conscience and 
fellow feeling – both self interested and not – push the narrator, through the course 
of the story, to first maintain Bartleby’s employment in spite of the loss of Bartleby’s 
services, and therefore of his value, then allow his tenancy in spite of the absence of 
any contribution Bartleby is making that would justify that tenancy, to ultimately 
offer him his charity, in spite of the lack of any self interested reason to do so, and 
finally, in the story’s last sentence, to despair of the loss of Bartleby’s humanity.     
All of the legal transformations that in turn constituted the legal framework 
within which the lawyer works and which dictated his relationship with his 
scrivener – changes in tort law that limited the responsibility of industrial era 
employers for injuries suffered by employees at work, and changes in contract law 
that expanded the reach of contract, including contractual powers to limit tort and 
status based liability – were ushered in, in part, through the judicial branch, 
including through the labors of Judge Lemuel Shaw, Melville’s father-in-law.55  All 
are either alluded to or detailed in Bartleby.  And, of most important to Thomas, and 
I think correctly so, all of these changes in jurisprudence take their legitimating toll 
on the lawyer-employer-narrator’s conscience: before the whole structure 
crumbles, the legal structures of tort, of contract, of charity, and of status, 
collectively, justify, in the lawyer’s mind, his tendency to commodify his own 
humanitarian instincts, his contract- rather than tort- or status-based sense of his 
duties toward his employees, as well as his attitude toward his own work, managing 
rich men’s bonds and titles, and of course managing his own law practice, which is 
itself as much a product of contract and property law, as is Bartleby’s work itself.    
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C.  Preference, Consent, Value, and Classical Legal Thought – in Bartleby  
 
The rise of contract, along with the diminution of tort, the disappearance of 
status, and the demise of republicanism, as the basis of social organization, all had 
one further implication, however, also vividly reflected in Melville’s story, and which 
Thomas, as well as all of the other protest writers, taken collectively, have seemingly 
missed.  The transformation of the legal system toward contract (and the changes 
within contract law as well toward a theory of consent rather than of relationality as 
the basis of contractual obligation) partly rested on, and partly generated, a 
transformation in the way utilitarian-inclined lawyers and jurists collectively 
defined, and regarded, value, or more generally, the good, and hence the common 
good, and particularly the value, both as accrued by individuals and as accrued by 
communities, which we hope to gain by virtue of law itself.  Value might of course be 
understood in any number of ways, but two possible ways of doing so had some sort 
of contemporary traction or pedigree among lawyers, legal scholars, and judges, by 
the middle of the nineteenth century:  we might understand value, as did Benthamic 
utilitarians, by reference to the quantum of pleasure over pain effectuated by some 
change in the world, including by law,56 or we might understand value, as did Millian 
utilitarians, roughly, by reference to an ideal of happiness – happiness as 
experienced by a well raised and educated hypothetical human subject.57   
According to the first understanding, which I’ll call hedonic utilitarianism, a change 
in the world, whether effectuated by law or any other act of power, creates value if it 
creates more pleasure than pain.  According to the second, which we can call ideal 
utilitarianism, a change in the world creates value if it creates more happiness, 
understood not by reference to felt pleasure and pain, but rather by reference to 
some sort of idealized conception of happiness or flourishing experienced by well 
educated and mature and moral persons, even if those persons are hypothetical.  
Law can be evaluated accordingly: a law, or a contract, or a legal decision, like any 
other act of power, is a good decision, or act, if it leads to more pleasure than pain as 
felt by all affected parties, under the first hedonic utilitarian theory, and if it leads to 
a greater quantum of happiness understood ideally, under the second, ideal or 
Millian account. 
Both of these early and mid nineteenth century emergent understandings of 
utilitarianism, and hence of value, were more or less displaced by the economization 
of the concept of value in economic and political theory – a transformation in the 
concept of value that came on the heels of, but also somewhat concurrently with, the 
rise of contract over tort and status in law, as historicized by Horwitz, as 
dramatized, somewhat, by Melville, and as felt and lived by Melville’s lawyer on Wall 
Street.  Rather than either subjective pleasure and pain, as was true on hedonic or 
benthamic conceptions of value, or objective conceptions of happiness, as per Mill, 
as the marker of value, according to pivotal economic and political theorists of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, we should look instead to the 
fulfillment, or satisfaction, of felt individual preferences – and hence the creation of 
wealth – as that satiation is manifested in consensual transactions registered in free 
markets.   Value, then, on a “wealth maximizing” account, is by definition created by 
the satisfaction of felt preferences, as manifested, paradigmatically in acts of 
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consent, as registered in free market choices, and not in increases in pleasure or 
diminutions of pain, or in idealized incremental improvement in the happiness or 
flourishing of hypothetical human actors.58  The reasons for the shift away from 
both pleasure or happiness to satiated preference as a means of measuring value 
varied, depending on the theorist, but in retrospect two major reasons, or 
arguments, for making the shift dominated:  First, the satisfaction of preferences as 
registered in consensual choices, unlike subjective pleasure or pain, and unlike 
happiness or flourishing, can be measured, or tallied, thus lending itself to greater 
certainty, and thus providing a more workable metric for decision-makers.59  
Second, the use of satisfied preference, rather than subjective pleasure or objective 
happiness, avoids supposed epistemic problems with both pleasure and pain and 
happiness – the measure of satisfied preferences, manifested in acts of consent, does 
not require the actor to compare subjective pleasures and pains across persons, as 
is required by hedonistic utilitarianism, or a choice between competing and perhaps 
irreconcilable objective conceptions of happiness, as required by ideal 
utilitarianism.60  Whatever the reasons for it, though, the transformation within 
utilitarianism of these conceptions of the good – away from subjective pleasure or 
objective happiness as that which should guide decision-making – to the much more 
behavioral conception of a revealed preference between choices, was hugely 
consequential.  As is widely understood, it gave rise to a normative economic and 
quasi-“scientific” account of the goodness of law, largely displacing classical 
utilitarian approaches.  But second, the entrenchment of that normative economic 
account in turn gave rise to what can fairly be called an “ethic of consent.”   
According to that ethic of consent, consensual acts and particularly bargains on 
open markets without third party affects are paradigmatically good: such bargains 
are by definition good, so long as there are no third party effects, because they 
definitionally satisfy manifested preferences, and hence create value, and hence 
wealth.61  
  The implications for law, and the way we evaluate and criticize it, of this 
transformation in concepts of value – the difference between, on the one hand, 
either a tabulation of felt pleasures and pains, or objective measures of happiness, 
as the felt measure of value, and on the other, the satisfaction of preferences as the 
way we go about doing so – are multiple, but that difference is felt most profoundly, 
or at any rate most transparently, in contract law and theory.  If value is created 
through the satisfaction of preferences which are in turn registered by acts of 
consent, then the consensual exchange that is the essence of contract, and of 
contract law, becomes paradigmatically good – it creates value by definition.62  By 
contrast, this is just not true, if value is understood as tied to either hedonic pleasure 
or idealized happiness: a consensual exchange may increase value on either hedonic 
or idealized utilitarian accounts of value, if each contractor well understands his 
own utility and is motivated to maximize it, but this is by no means necessarily the 
case: there may be all sorts of reasons that a satisfied preference may not well track 
either felt pleasure or objective happiness.  Contract law, over the course of the 
century following the setting of both Melville’s story and the transformation 
Horwitz described, was dominated by classical legal thought, and during that period, 
it basically absorbed this economic understanding of value, and hence this account 
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of the goodness of the contracts it governs.  One fairly well understood result of this 
transformation is an account of the definitional goodness of consensual contracts 
that in turn entails a robust – and in fact tautological – argument against 
paternalism: consensual contracts create value by definition, no matter how one-
sided or apparently unwise.63  A second fairly well understood result is that it 
prompts a turn toward individualism and against collectivism: individual 
consensual acts are the font of value, not anything done or experienced by 
collectives.   A third is that it created, or prompted, an expansive conception of 
contract’s reach: the commodification of everything and anything opens the 
possibility of its exchange, and therefore the creation of value.64  Doctrinally, it 
prompted an understanding of the meaning of contract that in turn transformed its 
legal definition and contours, from a shift in the understanding of both the 
consideration doctrine and the rules of offer and acceptance that requisite to a 
contract’s enforcement, to an understanding of the rationale and primacy of the 
expectation interest, to the rules governing recovery when a contract is breached.  
Lastly, and in sum, and as is also fairly well understood, it implied a powerful 
argument for the ethical primacy of contract law over both tort and administrative 
law as forms of social organization. 65 The latter, in various ways, blunt the force of 
contract and therefore frustrate the creation of value – at least to whatever degree 
that wealth and preference, rather than pleasure or happiness, are the lodestar of 
value.  
Now, this transformation in our understanding of value – away from either 
subjective pleasure or idealized happiness, to instead the satiation of preference, as 
the key to the creation of value, no less than the transformation of American private 
law – no less than the transformation of law, is also cleanly reflected, or narrated, in 
Bartleby.  This is the main point that I think is missing from Thomas’s otherwise 
fairly exhaustive account.  It’s reflected in three ways, the first two of which I’ll take 
up here, and the third, which I think is Melville’s most profound contribution in this 
novella, in the next section below.  So first, Melville’s story quite neatly presages 
nearly a century’s worth of criticism of that transformation – criticisms offered in 
various ways from legal realists in the early twentieth century, and by critical legal 
scholars, some liberal legalists, some identity scholars, and scores of moral and 
Marxist philosophers and neo-marxists from all disciplines in the second half of that 
century.  One point of commonality across these criticisms is that the consent that 
marks value, according to the economic conception, serves to legitimate whatever 
structures of power, of politics, or simply of inequality that rendered the transaction 
to which consent is ultimately given so attractive in the first place.  This 
“legitimation critique” of consensual ethics in justifying to the strong and the weak 
alike the various inequalities that constitute market economies, has loomed large 
over the last century of academic commentary and debate on the economization of 
the concept of value, and it also looms large in Bartleby the Scrivener: the narrator’s 
understanding of his employees and the nature of the employment contract, his 
cavalier dismissal at least in the first two thirds of the book of their economic needs 
and the insufficiency of their incomes to meet those needs, his understanding of the 
value to him of his own charitable instincts, his regard for the work of equity and 
chancery as tied to the income he received from it, rather than the good it does, his 
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repeated invocation of the nature of employment-at-will, his understanding of the 
meaning and purpose of real property and trespass law, all reflect not only the 
machinations and the legitimating consequence of the transformation of contract 
law, but also the legitimating effect of the transformation of the concept of value that 
underlies it.  It’s worth noting that the shift from pleasure or happiness, to satisfied 
preference, as constituting the content of the good, is explicitly referenced by the 
narrator himself in a pivotal scene, in which he bemoans the oddity of the 
expression, both in the mouth of Bartleby, but also as a contagion.  All of his 
employees, the narrator complains, as well as he himself, have taken to speaking 
about their preferences, rather than their intentions or desires.  The narrator finds 
the shift to the language of preference bizarre, and disorienting. 
Second, however, and I think of greater importance, both in the story and in 
the world, than the impact the transformation of value makes on the narrator, is the 
impact it has on Bartleby – and perhaps on the rest of us likewise.  Bartleby, in effect, 
is living out the consequence of the economization of value.  The most significant 
consequence of the transformation in our concept of value toward an economic 
measure focused on a behavior – the satiation of preference, as marked by 
consensual choices on open markets – may not be its contribution to machinations 
of legitimation, but rather, the contribution that transformation has made to the 
marginalization of the relevance of both subjective measures – such as pleasure and 
pain – or objective measures – such as happiness, or a good life – to our shared or 
individual conceptions of the good, and hence of the good life.  Again, on this 
transformed conception, it is satisfaction of preferences, as reflected in consensual 
market choices, that creates value and that therefore defines the good, not 
subjective pleasures or pains or objective conceptions of happiness.   Subjective 
sensations of pleasure or pain, as well as objective understandings of happiness, 
either don’t exist, or can’t be measured, or can’t be understood – either way they 
just have no use in determining what we should and shouldn’t value, according to 
economic and now dominant conceptions of value.   Bartleby, as imagined by 
Herman Melville, almost perfectly lives out just that economized understanding.  
Bartleby is the sum total of his preferences, and his life is the sum total of those 
preferences, satisfied.  Everything Bartleby would prefer not to do, he doesn’t, in 
fact, do.  He’s perfectly satiated.  And, just as important, is the flip side of this coin: 
Bartleby, more than any other character in American canonical literature, has no 
discernible hedonic life, and no objective interests, whether captured by a 
conception of happiness or not.  His pleasures and pains and his happiness, 
understood ideally, have been marginalized.  And – Bartleby, true to form, has no 
discernible pleasures or pains, and, he has no conception of the good life that he 
could pursue, even were he to have the access to it.  Bartleby is nothing but his 
expressed, conditional, negative, and, most important, satisfied preferences: first, his 
expressed preference not to copy, not to proof read, not to run errands, not to work, 
not to leave his employer’s office, not to take up any other offered employment, not 
to leave the banister of his ex-employer’s ex-office, and not to accept either charity 
or food, and eventually his implied positive preference to do nothing, to live in the 
law office as long as possible, then to live out his life in the tombs, and then to starve 
himself to death.   None of these preferences, either hypothetical or fulfilled, 
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translate into a knowable, communicable subjective hedonic life:  his employer 
cannot discern Bartleby’s inner life, but particularly cannot discern what pleases or 
pains him.  Nor does Bartleby have any identifiable, knowable, conception of the 
good or of happiness that he is pursuing.  He is nothing but his preferences, virtually 
all of which are satisfied: he does no copying, no proofreading and eventually no 
work, he remains in the office and then in prison as was his preference, without food 
as was likewise what he preferred, until he died, again by force of his own 
preference.  He has plenty of preferences, all of which are satisfied.  What Bartleby 
utterly lacks is precisely what is rendered marginal or non-existent by our 
transformation to an economized conception of value:  any interior hedonic life or 
objective conception of the good.  Bartleby, as a character, is nothing but the very 
behavior that has come to constitute our conception of value.  And that conception 
kills him.   
If we centralize this feature of Melville’s story – Bartleby’s character, 
decisions, and role in the story, rather than the narrator’s conscience or 
consciousness, law itself, or the role of legitimation in the narrator’s mindset  – and 
we then feature this aspect of Bartleby’s character – his enactment of the then rising 
and now dominant economic theory of value in the way we think about the good – 
and if we don’t romanticize that enactment (as the protest readers all do, Agamben 
almost absurdly so) or pathologize it, then much of the mysteriousness of Bartleby, 
as a character, and of his reception, withers away.  It is clear, first, why so many 
readers can’t empathize with Bartleby – he reveals no hedonistic life with which to 
empathize and no conception of the good by which we can understand him.  It’s also 
clear why he is so existentially disturbing to his employer: in this quite central 
respect, the lawyer too much resembles him.  Bartleby personifies the way in which 
the narrator himself understands the value of his employees, his own value to his 
clients, the value of his charitable and humane instincts, and the value of his work to 
the world – and it is a profoundly disturbing and, yes, inhumane picture.  Likewise, 
it’s clear why Bartleby’s repeated use of the phrase “I would prefer” drives his 
employer to an irritated distraction: it presents a conception of a human being 
whose self understanding and whose value consists of a hypothetical inference that 
can be drawn about a superficial aspect of his life from a small slice of behavior, 
rather than from any deeper understanding of subjective life or any objective 
conception of the good.  Bartleby’s idiosyncrasies are also clarified.  It’s clear, for 
example, why Bartleby eats so little – he doesn’t take anything in, because he has no 
interiority, no subjectivity, no mammalism or animalism, and hence no biologic 
inner being that consists of soft squishy matter sustained and nurtured by food – he 
is, again, the sum of his revealed preferences.  He’s behavior, not substance, 
particularly soft, squishy, internal substance.  And it’s clear why he has no interests, 
no family, no ambition, and no human connections – just as he has no interiority, he 
has no objectively defined or ascertainable conception of what it might mean to lead 
a good life.  Thus, as is true of the economized conceptions of value that have now so 
dominated contract law, and increasingly law across the board, both subjective 
hedonism and objective interest have been displaced, in Bartleby and in how we 
understand him, by a tabulation of his satisfied preferences, as measures of what is 
good and right.  
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 Mostly, though, it’s clear why Bartleby’s humanity is in fact so ambiguous: 
Bartleby has no hedonic life, and he has no ideal life.  Both are essential to our 
humanity.  Rather, what is of value to him, as well as the value he produces, 
according to this conception of value imposed upon him, is not tied to either his 
animality, or to his mammalism, or to his own or any other conception of the good – 
what is of value is not tied to either his subjective hedonism nor to objective 
understandings of happiness.  It is tied instead to the satisfaction of his preferences 
– both his positive and negative preferences – as they are registered on discernible 
markets.  It is tied, in other words, to a small piece of behavior – a “revealed 
preference” – that is common to humans, corporations and computers all  – 
common, that is, to any entity that can on the basis of an algorithm register a choice 
between proffered alternatives.  There’s just nothing distinctively or particularly 
human about any of that. 
 
D.  Bartleby’s Consensual Dysphoria 
 
Finally, a focus on Bartleby as a man, who enacts – who lives out – the 
economization of value, also might clarify the basis on which some might empathize 
with him, in spite of all of this: in spite, that is, of his peculiarity, and in spite of the 
inhumanity of the conception of value he enacts.  Bartleby is not in fact a machine, or 
a ghost, or a cadaver, as the narrator is well aware.  He does, after all, show flickers 
of an inner life at various points in the story: he expresses his exasperation and 
dismay – in fact, his pain – with his employer’s obtuseness regarding his own failing 
eyesight,66 he expresses contempt for his employer’s presence in the jail,67 and he 
expresses a positive desire for stability in his life.68  He shows enough of his hedonic 
self, in fact, that his misery – his melancholy – comes through.  And, also in common 
with the other humans who walk the planet, he does have a past: we know he 
worked in a dead letter office.  We know also something of his conception of the 
good life: we know that he wishes to remain both relatively stationary – still – but 
also unconfined.69  We know he experiences pain from his predicament, although we 
see little or none of it, and virtually no pleasure. How might this Bartleby – a 
Bartleby who experiences pleasure and pain but only fleetingly reveals it, and who 
may have a conception of the good although it mostly cannot be known to us, 
experience the conception of value he enacts?  How does Bartleby experience the 
economized theory of value to which he so methodically and repetitively gives 
voice?  How do any of the rest of us experience that conception of value? 
This is not a question that gets much asked, even by critics of economized 
value.  To review: value, on the economized view, is created paradigmatically 
through consensual exchanges, or bargains, that satisfy the preferences of the 
parties, including consensual exchanges of labor for pay.  This view displaces two 
quite different conceptions of value: one, hedonistic, that identifies value with 
pleasure and pain, and the second, idealist, which identifies value, roughly, with the 
furtherance of objective interests or some objective account of the good.  As the 
economic conception rises in prestige and then influence, particularly as ways to 
evaluate law and politics, both of these alternatives recede: there is, after all, no 
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necessary connection between the creation of value, so defined, on the one hand, 
and either pleasure and pain, or any conception of the good, on the other.  
 Now, the split between the economized conception of value that centers 
preferences, and the Millian (or Aristotlean, or Nussbaumian) conception of value 
mentioned above that center objective interests or accounts of the good (or of 
human flourishing), has been much criticized, by critics.70   For any number of 
reasons, well catalogued by those critical accounts, individuals may consent to 
transactions which don’t further their own interests, on virtually any defensible 
conception of the good life, and because of that disjuncture, there is a very real gap 
between the value created by economic measures and the furtherance of the good, 
as understood by philosophers, both for those who so consent and third parties.  An 
individual may have internalized, for example, a stunted conception of his own 
potential, or a warped understanding of the choices facing him. Because of 
background, training, or upbringing, he or she may have a distorted sense of what 
will or won’t be “in his interest.”  Even more clearly, his revealed preferences as 
between proffered choices are a function of the choices he is offered, and those may 
be negligible; even Aesop understood that the wolf may come to have a taste for 
sour grapes, simply because those are the grapes close to the ground and within 
reach.71  Or, the individual may have a false understanding of what leads to a good 
life because he has been trained for a life of obedience or submission.  A wife may 
think that a life ruled solely by the demands of maternity, or the mandates of a 
patriarch, is the best to which she can aspire – and so on.   There are any number of 
reasons our contractually revealed preferences may not further our objective 
interests.  A contract law, and law generally, that doesn’t incorporate in some 
fashion this pretty obvious truth will entrap its subjects in the preferences their 
current situation dictates, and will thus legitimate the possibly unjust hierarchical 
arrangements that in part generate those thwarted choices.  Our choices, in other 
words, for any number of well recognized reasons, may not be in our own best 
interest, and when they are not, there is at least an argument for paternalistic or 
administrative intervention into markets, based on a shared conception of the good 
– the value of which must then be weighed against the liberty thereby sacrificed. 
What has not been so criticized, though, or studied, are the consequences of 
the abandonment of hedonistic – or, loosely, Benthamic – accounts of value, and 
their displacement with preference-based conceptions.  Presumably, just as we 
sometimes prefer that which is not in our objective interest, because of the influence 
of pernicious forces, likewise we sometimes prefer that which will not subjectively 
please us, or something which may subjectively pain us.  Just as we may be mistaken 
about our interests so we may be mistaken about what will further minimize our 
pain or promote our pleasures.  Or, we may harbor masochistic tendencies.  Or, we 
may be inclined to prioritize the interests of others (such as masters or patriarchs) 
over our own pleasure and pain.  Or, we may be inclined to react altruistically rather 
than selfishly and for that reason sacrifice our subjective hedonistic utility.  Our 
revealed preferences may not reflect our own inner calculation of pleasure and pain.  
Pleasure and pain may not, in fact, be our “masters.”  Bentham might have just been 
wrong about that.  
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Of course, if we simply define pleasure as that which we maximize, and pain 
as that which we minimize, when we satisfy our preferences, then the problem 
disappears: there simply can be no disjunction, by definitional fiat, of the pleasures 
and pains felt by our hedonic self and our satiated preferences acted upon by our 
preferring self.  But what happens if, in the face of this definitional circularity, we 
nevertheless experience our satisfied preferences, on the one hand, and our pleasure 
and pain as diverging?  What if, contrary to that seductive definitional assumption, 
we actually experience ourselves as consenting to transactions in situations where 
those transactions do not please us hedonically and rather cause pain?  How do we 
“process” that disparity, mentally, psychically, emotionally?  How do we live with the 
fact that some of our choices, unquestionably consensual, unambiguously registered 
in our market choices, and that undoubtedly satiate our preferences without even a 
hint of false consciousness entering the picture, make us miserable?  How do we 
process the disconnect between the self presupposed by the economization of value 
– one which is made subjectively more pleasant and less pained with every 
consensual trade and with every satiated preference – and the self we might 
experience, that is made miserable by the choices we make between miserable 
options?  How do we reconcile our hedonic self, so marginalized, and our preferring 
or consensual self, so elevated by the economization of value? 
One way, I suggest, that we might react to such a disjuncture may be with a 
dysphoric alienation from one’s hedonic self, which brings me round to my title, and 
back to Bartleby.  The hedonic self – the self that reckons pleasure and pain, that 
registers desire, that feels the world as hot or cold or smooth or rough, that is 
pained or pleased or soothed or hurt by fire and wind and rain and children and 
parents and sex and work and love and fear – that self, simply recedes, in felt 
importance, presence, and vitality, even to oneself, as the consensual, choosing, and 
preferring self – rather than the experiencing hedonic self – takes center stage.  
One’s choices, particularly one’s market choices, reflect our satiated preferences, 
and because they do so, they definitionally create value.  Presumably, they should 
track as well our conception of the good – they should further the interests of our 
ideal self – and presumably, they should also maximize our felt pleasures and 
minimize our pain – they should further the interests of our hedonic self.  But what 
if they don’t?  If they don’t further our interests, then we squelch the ideal self, and 
all our awareness of it, as critics of the economized conception of the self have long 
maintained: we quiet our ambitions, we settle for sour grapes, we limit our reach, 
we dull our own consciousness.  What has not been so noticed, though, is what 
happens when they don’t track our hedonic selves.  Might we likely just squelch that 
one as well?  And if so, what does that mean? It might mean at least this much: it 
might mean that we dull our capacity for intense pleasure, because we have 
minimized its relevance to our own wellbeing.  It might mean that we marginalize 
the importance of our own desires, because we no longer heed their guidance.  It 
might mean that we minimize the significance and meaning of our own pain, 
because we don’t avoid its cause.  Basically, it might mean that we might turn away 
from those lessons of the two hedonic masters Bentham thought we invariably, 
always, respect – pain and pleasure – in order to accommodate the world that 
displeases us, by casting the self so pained or displeased aside.  
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If we do that over a long enough period of time – maybe an entire adulthood 
– if we consistently consent to that which displeases or pains us – then I think it’s 
fair to say that the result might be “consensual dysphoria”: dysphoria, because like 
all forms of dysphoria, it is an intense unease in one’s own body, and “consensual,” 
because the root of the experience is the disconnect between the act of consent and 
the presumed increase in wellbeing it brings, according to the economized theory of 
value, and the displeasure or pain felt by one’s hedonic self by virtue of what that 
consenting self is up to.  The economic self consents to transactions, trades, and 
bargains, satiating preferences along the way.  The hedonic self feels no increase in 
wellbeing when the economic self does so.  Yet the former is supposed to bring 
about the latter.  But it doesn’t.  So, the hedonic self is minimized, or cabined, or 
numbed, or erased.  The point I want to insist on is that this phenomenon, if it exists, 
is not false consciousness, sour grapes, or “exogenous preferences.” Those too are 
real phenomena, found in the gap between the economic self and the ideal self, the 
gap between our choices, and what does or doesn’t further one’s own interests.  It is 
the gap, in other words, between the satiation of preference, which creates 
economic value by definition, and the furtherance of interest, which might or might 
not be occasioned by preference-based decisions.  By “consensual dysphoria”, I 
mean to refer to the subjective experience of a different gap – not between 
preference and objective interest, however defined, but rather, between preference 
and pleasure, between the economic and the hedonic self.   Where there is a gap, if it 
is experienced as such, the result might be dysphoria.  If it is experienced routinely, 
across the course of a lifetime, the hedonic self might just die. 
Perhaps Bartleby, as depicted by Melville, suffers from consensual dysphoria, 
and perhaps that accounts for the ability of some of us, including a number of OWS 
protestors, to empathize with him.  We can all recognize, readily, the gap between 
Bartleby’s preferring self and his ideal self.  Bartleby prefers not to work, find his 
own home, avoid jail, have intimacy in his life, or eventually, to eat.  Yet, his ideal self 
– his real interests, the good he ought to be pursuing – we all –  narrator, reader, 
passersby – know – would be furthered with work, with pay, with a home of his 
own, and with nutrition: all of which he is offered, and all of which he prefers not to 
accept.  His revealed preferences then are not tracking his actual interests.  But 
there is another gap the reader and the narrator might see in Bartleby, that is more 
disturbing.  Bartleby’s preferences are at a radical disjuncture with his hedonic 
pleasures and pains, with his felt, sensate experiences of those choices, and with his 
biologic being in the world.  His translucence, his pallid appearance, his cadaverous 
utterances, his forlornness, and his behavior – the staring out the window at a blank 
wall, standing motionless, his refusal of money and food, his refusal to move – all 
point us to a person who has numbed himself to animalistic and mammalistic 
experiences of pleasure and pain.  He doesn’t seem to be registering either, and the 
more his preferences are satiated, the worse the numbness becomes.  His biologic 
being, of course, eventually is killed by this – by his own lethal preferences.  His 
hedonic being dies alongside.    
 
Conclusion 
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By 2011, there was no shortage of anti-Wall Street fiction, from which the 
OWSers could have drawn moral support, and from which they could have picked a 
mascot.  Just from the prior thirty years, they could have embraced, as a guiding or 
informative text, Tom Wolfe’s Bonfire of the Vanities, a near-canonical modernist 
depiction of a morally compromised Wall Street bond salesman, American Psycho, 
the graphic account of a psychopathic and misogynistic Wall Street stockbroker who 
merges making a killing on Wall Street with making killings, period, Wall Street, the 
near-classic film depiction of capitalist greed and crime that came to define the go-
go eighties, or Boiler Room from the 1990s and The Wolf of Wall Street from the 
2000 teens, both of which depicted the criminal activities of the same penny stock 
scammer.  Yet it was Melville’s mid-19th century novella, depicting an enigmatic, 
profoundly opaque and sickly scrivener, as told by his by-no-means-criminal and 
by-no-means particularly selfish or greedy wall street lawyer-employer – a man 
who by the end of the story has offered his scrivener his own charity, money and 
home in his attempt to save his life – that grabbed their attention.   It’s worth 
wondering why.  One possibility is that the OWSers themselves, by this choice, 
seemed to be suggesting that it’s not greedy or criminal or psychotic or even cynical 
or morally compromised Wall Street brokers or lawyers that we need to watch out 
for.  It is, rather, what we value and how.  And, one of the costs – not the only cost, 
but one of the costs – of what we value, and how, may be our own alienation from 
our hedonic selves: the selves that experience the world not as one which we make 
and remake through our autonomous choices, but rather, as pleasing or painful, as 
soothing or cutting, as nurturing and comforting or threatening and hurtful, as 
sustaining or draining.  As we discredit our hedonic selves as a measure of what we 
value and why, in preference for our choosing selves, we may be honoring our 
autonomy while killing the animal within.  The result may be a freer self who, like 
Bartleby, is cadaverous, melancholic, pallid and forlorn.  And dead. 
Why did we miss this, if this is, at least in part, the lesson we might learn 
from Melville’s Story of Wall Street?  I think there are two – fully sufficient – reasons, 
although I’m sure there are others as well.  First, sustained critique of the 
disjuncture between economic and hedonic conceptions of value that the story 
plausibly depicts is missing in the academic literature, including the literature most 
pointedly critical of that economic conception itself.  In law, the focus of the critics of 
the economic conception of value has been, instead, on the transformation of 
American law reflected and in part fueled by that conception – the critique of 
formalism, classical legal thought, and liberal legalism.  In moral and political 
philosophy, and some legal philosophy as well, particularly from the critical legal 
studies movement of the 1980s, critics of the economic conception of value have 
focused on the disjuncture between that conception and various objective accounts 
of the good, whether those accounts be Millian or Aristotlean or Marxian, and 
whether “interest” based, capabilities based, or something more naturalistic.  Both 
strands of critique are well reflected in the critical responses to Bartleby: thus, 
legally sophisticated critics such as Thomas have noted, and commented upon, the 
legitimating effect of legal formalism on the diminution of conscience of powerful 
elites, and the diminution of the public sphere, and its subordination to markets, and 
seen all of that well-recorded in Melville’s story, while moral and political 
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philosophers, including, in different ways, Bartlett, Agamben, Poore and Zizek all, 
have seen in Bartleby echoes of the radical disjunction between economics 
conceptions of value and some objective ideal account of the good.  The 
abandonment of hedonic rather than ideal accounts of the good for consent and 
preference based accounts – the gap, in other words, between economic accounts of 
value and Benthamic accounts, rather than, between economic accounts of value 
and Millian accounts – has not generated nearly as great a critical literature, and it is 
just that absence that is in turn reflected in the gaps in the critical reception of 
Bartleby. 
  Second, the contours, the profundity and even the logic of that displacement 
– much less the dysphoria it might occasion – didn’t set in in any sort of clear way 
until several decades into the twentieth century, or three quarters of a century after 
Melville’s story.  Melville’s story, in other words, was not just a narrative and fictive 
accounting of the transformation of American law and value, then under way.  It was 
also prescient.  More specifically, it was a prescient narrative indictment of the 
economization of conceptions of value that underlaid that transformation, the 
contours of which, however, would only become clear well after the time of the 
story, and of Melville’s writing of it.  More specifically still, it was a prescient 
depiction of the political-psychological maladies that would eventually accompany 
it.  Melville nailed that in his story, in addition to much else.  He depicted – but also 
predicted – the maladies such a transformation in value would bring on, as 
manifested in the pathos of his famous scrivener. Melville’s prescient account of 
consensual dysphoria, in short, is what is missing in the voluminous protest 
literature that this story of Wall Street has inspired.  It may also be what the Wall 
Street protestors found so compelling – and so sadly familiar – in Melville’s most 
forlorn character. 
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